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There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude 
like: 
The Principle of Inferential J ustification (PIJ): "To be justi-
fied in believing one proposition P on the basis of another prop-
osition E, one must be (1) justified in believing E, (2) justified 
in believing that E makes probable P" .1 
and ends up by challenging our capacity to justifiedly believing 
propositions concerning physical objects and past events. This is, 
at least, what Richard Fumerton claims, but, like Christopher 
Hookway,2 I doubt that there is such a route. 
The plausibility of PIJ in ordinary contexts relies, according to 
Hookway, on a number of assumptions like, for instance, the need 
to distinguish between salient information and background view of 
things. The problem is that Fumerton's sceptical route requires 
the application of PIJ not only to particular beliefs but to broad 
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epistemic classes of beliefs and, as Hookway tries to emphasize, 
this strategy is ultimately inconsistent with the need to maintain 
the aforementioned distinction and, in general, with the assump-
tions that rendered PIJ plausible in the first place. This worry is 
not, on the other hand, unconnected with the conviction that, 
contrary to what Fumerton claims, the notion of justification is 
inextricably associated with our needs to make normative judge-
ments. As Hookway puts it, " ... None who was not sensitive to 
our needs to make normative judgments could understand or share 
our concepts of rational belief or cruelty; they would not be able 
to)s·ee how the terms should be applied to wholly novel kinds of 
casús=for they would lack the sense of what is !evaluatively simi-
lar' which is required for doing this." 3 
In the coming pages, I seek to show how Hookway's challenge 
may find additional motivation in a reflection on the content of a 
certain kind of belief, namely: beliefs about particular causal pro-
cesses. To this purpose, I shall firstly point out two assumptions 
on which Fumerton's sceptical route relies. Secondly, I will ex-
plore how these two assumptions are linked to reductionist ac-
counts of cau.sation and, consequently, to a certain view about 
the content of our causal beliefs. More specifically, I will argue 
that Fumerton's line of argument does not follow from a rather 
uncontentious understanding of PIJ, but on a certain interpreta-
tion of it that presupposes the availability of a reductionist ac-
count of causation. This upshot will certainly diminish the appeal 
of Fumerton's route insofar as its plausibility will now depend on 
a rather substantial and controversial metaphysical contention. Re-
latedly, it will become clear that, if the project of the causal re-
ductionist would after all fail, then one should accept that the 
conditions under which a belief about a particular causal process 
is justified cannot be enumerated independently of the normative 
constraints that are proper to a certain causal inquiry. And this 
will surely come to reinforce Hookway's critical intuitions. 
1. Two assumptions in Fumerton's sceptical route 
For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on Fumerton's presentation 
of the structure of sceptical arguments about "our access to the 
past through memory" ,4 which he envisages as fundamental, al-
though much of what I will say about this case also applies to 
sceptical arguments concerning our beliefs about physical objects. 
j_ 
_L 
. -.. .-.. 
.! 
. j 
j 
.! 
j 
c 
i 
+. 
31. JUSTIFICATION, SCEPTICISM AND CAUSAL BELIEFS 379 
Fumerton insists that, accordiri.g to PIJ, one could only justi-
fiedly believe P on the basis of memory experiences if one could 
justifiedly believe that memory experiences are reliable indicators 
of past events. The problem is ·that there is no way in which one 
could justifiedly have such a belief. Inductive inference would be 
useless at this juncture because one could not justifiedly belief 
the premise of that inference. As Fumerton puts it_, "an inductive 
justification for the reliability of memory would proceed from a 
premise describing correlations between past memory experiences 
and the events we took them to correctly represent" 5. It follows 
from these remarks, however, that 
(A) There are certain facts (i.e., facts concerning a correlation 
between past events and memory experiences) with regard 
to which we cannot have justified beliefs under any circum-
stances. And, nevertheless, they are such that, if we could 
have rational beliefs about -them, then we could determine 
whether we can have justified beliefs about the past on the 
basis of memory experiences. 
This is the first assumption I intended to highlight; the second 
has been appropriately stressed by Hookway in his paper. As he 
points out, cases where PIJ sounds plausible are concerned with 
the justification of a particular belief where we rely on our ability 
to pick out salient information against a background view of things, 
and not with a broad class of belief. Fumerton, however, takes 
PIJ ·out of these ordinary contexts, and applies it to the evalua-
tion of broad epistemic classes of beliefs. He assumes that 
(B) the conditions under which beliefs 'of a certain class may be 
justified can be specified independently of the fact that, 
against a certain background view, a bit of information may 
count as evidence in favour of a particular belief of that 
class. 
This assumption sounds quite reasonable if one judges that part 
of what clause (1) in PIJ demands is that we should be justified 
in holding the background view against which the epistemic rele-
vance of a bit of information is to be assessed. And one might 
think that, according to PIJ, one could only rationally believe in 
a background view if one could justifiedly believe all the proposi-
tions that compose that background view. This amounts to as-
suming that the distinction between background view and salient 
information is ultimately irrelevant from the viewpoint of justifi-
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cation or, in other words, that the conditions under which a be-
lief is justified are not relative to a certain background view that 
is taken for granted.6 In terms due to. Hookway, we can say that 
(B) characterises a substantial notion of justification, which op-
poses to a contextualist proposal according to which questions 
about justification "arise within specific contexts, influenced by a 
body of background certainties, shaped by the goals which govern 
our inquiries and so on." 7 
j_ 
Let us now see how assumptions (A) and (B) are connected to 
different accounts of causation. I will, in this respect, argue that . 
úsuméíáons=(A) and (B) would after all be unintelligible if the 
caúsal=anti-reductionist were right and, therefore, that Fumer-
ton's sceptical route relies on the success of causal reductionism. 
To reach this conclusion I will rely on a plausible claim, namely: 
that, if causal reductionist projects would ultimately fail, then 
the distinction between a cause and its background conditions 
will come up as metaphysically indispensable, as a distinction that 
will irreducibly intervene in the individuation of causes.8 
2. Causal anti-reductionism and Fumerton's 
assumptions 
To see how Fumerton's sceptical route depends on the success of 
causal reductionism, let us reflect about how the collapse of the 
latter may affect the assumptions on which Fumerton's argument 
relies. Suppose then that, as the causal anti-reductionist claims, 
the individuation of a cause is irreducibly relative to some back-
ground conditions, and consider my belief that 
(1) The bridge collapsed because this bolt snapped 
Under what conditions may I be justified in believing (1)? Let us 
assume that (1) is a belief of the class contemplated by PIJ, namely: 
a belief that one holds "on the basis of others or -on the basis of 
some body of evidence." 9 We are then entitled to ask: what is the 
E on the basis of which (1) may be rationally endorsed? We may 
surely justify a particular causal belief like (1) against a certain 
background of causal beliefs. My point is, however, that, if the 
reductionist project is damned, then one cannot intelligibly ask 
for the sort of justification that Fumerton's sceptical route re-
quires, that is, the kind of justification that a causal belief about 
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a particular causal pro·cess would have in virtue of our justifiedly 
believing that a certain kind of correlation holds, namely: a cor-
relation to which, as a matter of principle, we cannot have any 
epistemic access. For either that correlation involves particular 
causal facts or it does not. If it does not, the causal anti-
reductionist will deny that any fact of such a kind might even 
count as a candidate for justifying a belief about a particular 
causal fact. For if there were any necessary correlation between 
noncausal facts, that notion of 'necessity' would have, ex hypoth-
esi, nothing to do with the causal notion of 'necessary condition', 
that is, with the kind of necessary connection that would render 
that causal belief true. If, on the contrary, the correlation at stake 
does involve some particular causal facts, then it cannot be envis-
aged, in contrast with what Fumerton's route presupposes, as en-
tirely independent of our epistemic ability to highlight a cause 
against certain background conditions, since, for a causal anti-
reductionist, all particular causal facts are indispensably individ-
uated in the light of that contraposition. 
It is clear besides that, with regard to each particular causal 
process, there is a number of different ways in which the distinc-
tion between causes and background conditions may legitimately 
be drawn and, consequently, that there is no metaphysically priv-
ileged stance from which that distinction should be drawn. It is 
only relative to the interests and procedures that define a given 
causal inquiry that a certain way of drawing the distinction may 
appear as appropriate. It follows that, if the causal anti-reductionist 
is right , particular causal facts are in part metaphysically individ-
uated by our ability to pick up causes against their respective 
background conditions in the context of a certain causal inquiry. 
And this should indeed be construed as a metaphysical claim, not 
merely as a statement about the meaning of 'particular causal 
facts'.10 We can then say that, insofar as Fumerton conceives the 
kind of fact to which assumption (A) appeals as causal, he cannot 
assume that such a fact can be individuated independently of the 
purposes of a certain causal inquiry and, in general, of our episte-
mic ability to pick out a cause against its causal background. For 
what the causal anti-reductionist denies is precisely that there 
might be particular causal facts whose individuation were consti-
tutively independent of that epistemic ability. But, if Fumerton's 
causal facts are defined as epistemically inaccessible, how could 
they depend on our epistemic ability to draw the relevant distinc-
tion between the cause and its causal background? VIe can thus 
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conclude that the intelligibility of assumption (A) depends on the 
success of the reductionist project with regard to causation. . 
This line of reasoning is also relevant to assumption (B). Our 
previous remarks serve tD motivate not only the idea that the 
distinction between salient information and background view is 
constitutive of our beliefs about partkular causal processes, but 
also the claim that that distinction is indispensable in the deter-
mination of the conditions under which an agent may be justified 
in holding any such belief. We have seen that, if the causal anti-
reductionist is right about the way the content of certain causal 
b(iliefs is determined, then having those causal beliefs involves the 
ability to individuate causes within a certain causal backgTound. 
It is proper, however, to any ability that its possession is not 
accidentally connected to its displays. Hence, having the episte-
mic ability to set apart the cause from its causal background, 
entails that the agent's causal beliefs do not bear a merely acci-
dental relation to the causal facts. But what should count as an 
appropriate relation to the particular causal facts? Can it be de-
termined regardless of the causal inquiry that contributes to fix 
the .relevant particular causal facts , that is, independently of the 
procedures that are recognized as appropriate within that causal 
inquiry? 
It is part of the anti-reductionist conclusion that particular causal 
facts are fL"'{ed relative to a certain epistemic perspective, to a 
certain relation of the epistemic agent to the world that is recog-
nized as relevant in the context of a given investigation. A con-
textualist notion of justi£cation would characterise that epistemic 
perspective (and, indeed, the appropriate relation to the causal 
facts) as dependent on the purposes of the causal inquiry. By 
contrast, a substantial notion of justification would attempt to 
characterise that epistemic perspective independently of any causal 
inquiry; in other words, this substantial notion would presuppose 
the possibility of presenting that perspective as a context-free re-
lation R between an agent A and certain facts. Yet, if Fumerton 
would construe relation R as depending on some pGtrticular causal 
facts, trivially the anti-reductionist would insist that its identifi-
cation would inevitably be relative to -the interests and proce-
dures of a given a causal inquiry and, consequently, relation R 
could hardly serve the purposes of a substantial notion of justifi-
cation. Suppose, on the contrary, that Fumerton would envisage 
R as independent of any particular causal fact. In that case, if R 
is to grasp the conditions under which agent A would be justified 
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in having a belief about a particular causal fact, then R should, 
among other things.) determine whether A has the ability to draw 
the relevant distinction between the cause and its causal back-
ground. But this amounts to saying that there is an independent 
metaphysical relation that may account for that ability, whereby 
the ability at stake would come up as metaphysically irrelevant 
with regard to the individuation of particular ·causal processes. 
But this is precisely what the causal anti-reductionist denies. It 
follows that, if the anti-reductionist is right, then no substantial 
notion of justification is available with regard to a certain kind of 
belief, namely: beliefs about particular causal processes. This re-
sult surely clashes with assumption (B) and, consequently, calls 
into question the intelligibility of applying PIJ to that class of 
belief. 
It is easy to see, however, that this line of reasoning may give 
rise to a more general challenge. Consider, in this respect, how the 
correlation between, say, past events and memory experiences, 
should be construed according to assumption (A). Either it relies 
on particular causal processes or it does not. In the former case, 
our previous line of argument trivially applies. In the latter case, 
Fumerton would have to present the correlation at stake as the 
outcome of an inductive inference on the basis of some noncausal 
sequences. Yet, it sounds reasonable to reply that if, as we are as-
suming, particular causal facts are metaphysically irreducible, then 
a legitimate inductive inference of that kind cannot be ulíúaíÉló=
alien to the kind of metaphysical dependence that articulates such 
facts. And, consequently, we may affirm that, if any noncausal sÉú=
quence may appropriately act as the basis of an inductive infer-
ence, that sequence could not be construed as totally independent 
of particular causal facts. It follows that the only way in which 
the anti-reductionist can interpret Fumerton's sceptical route about 
physical objects and the past, is such that the facts that are men-
tioned in assumption (A) involve particular causal process.es. But 
we have seen that on this interpretation assumption (A) is unintel-
ligible to the causal anti-reductionist. 
NOTES 
1. Fumerton (1995), p. 36. 
2. Cf. Hookway (2000). 
3. Hookway (1998), p. 911. 
4. Fumerton (1995), p. 34. 
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5. Fumerton (1995), p. 35. Fumerton describes the structure of sceptical argu-
ments about the past like this: 
''The argument for síúong=skepticism with respect to the past also relies 
on clause 2 insisting that any justified conclusion about the past inferred 
from what we seem to remember must include justification for believing 
that memory experiences are a reliable indicator of past events. Again, 
when an inductive justification of such reliability is attempted, clause 1 of 
the principle invoked to challenge our ability to rationally believe the prem-
ise of the inductive argument, a premise that will describe past events 
and again require an inference based on memory." (p. 36) 
'l · It is easy to see that this strong scepticism about our access to the past 
based on memory experiences can hardly be conceived as local, that is, as 
being merely concerned with an isolated class of beliefs. For it seems clear 
that such beliefs are inevitably involved in the justification of any other 
belief that one might have. Cf. Fumerton (1995, p. 50). 
6. Hookway (2000) describes Fumerton's stance on this issue as follows: ''In 
assessing the proposition, we are concerned with every item of information 
that is in any way relevant to the rationality of our acceptance of it. The 
concern of all possible evidence rather than with salient evidence is linked to 
the focus upon broad epistemological qualification rather than with specific 
·concrete classifications." (p. 348) 
7. Hookway (2000, p. 359). 
8. For a detailed defence of this claim, cf. Corbi and Prades (2000), eh. 5. 
9. Hookway (2000, p. 345). This is surely the most favourable option for Fum-
erton's purposes. 
10. It is important to notice that my anti-sceptical argument does have the 
following shape: 
"If we think of the world as containing particular causal processes, then 
we are able to identify particular causal processes." 
In this respect, my argument certainly parallels the kind of anti-sceptical 
statement that Barry Stroud (1968) imputes to Peter F. Strawson, although 
the latter is concerned with the identification not of particular causal pro-
cesses, but of particular objects. There is, however, a difference that I judge 
crucial. My rebuttal of the sceptical argument rests on a preliminary explo-
ration of the conditions under which particular causal processes may be in-
dividuated. It is only after the conclusion has beeti reached that the distinction 
between the cause and its background conditions is metaphysically indispens-
able, that one can legitimately affirm that conditional statement. 
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